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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

**Top Secret** 

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EGYPT: President Sadat has again warned of the inevitability of renewed fighting with Israel while reiterating his continued interest in a political way out of the impasse.

Decrying the failure of political efforts to resolve the conflict, the Egyptian President, in an address to the nation yesterday, repeatedly declared that fighting had been imposed on him and that the coming battle would be all-out. Sadat stated that he wanted peace but that sometimes "peace can only be bought by blood." He intimated, however, that hostilities might not be an immediate prospect by cautioning that he was not ready to involve his country or his armed forces in an operation for which he had "not made complete calculations." Sadat also counseled that before the confrontation the Egyptian domestic front must achieve the same level of preparedness that the military had. exhorted the Egyptian people "not to ask what Egypt can offer them...but ask what they can offer Egypt." In a development possibly related to Sadat's domestic campaign, Egypt's semi-official newspaper al-Ahram subsequently reported that a cabinet shuffle was in the offing which included the naming of a new prime minister.

In his speech Sadat predictably rebuked Washington's close association with Israel and described the reported US decision to provide additional fighter aircraft to Israel as premeditated and unjustified. Although he made no direct threats against specific US interests in the Middle East, Sadat did allude to the importance of Arab oil to the US. Sadat also reiterated his statement that he had stopped all contacts with the US concerning a political solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute and added that "the Americans might as well save their breath about finding a solution."

In spite of the generally pessimistic tone of Sadat's address, and his vow that there would be no negotiations, he was careful to indicate that "political action has not stopped." He reaffirmed Cairo's support for UN special envoy Gunnar Jarring by stating that he should be the main focus of future political efforts and that it was "everyone's duty to support him."

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GHANA: Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong has apparently gained control in Accra.

The capital is calm; there were no significant armed clashes or bloodshed yesterday as the coup group gradually gained control of the city. A few officials in the capital who tried to rally loyal security forces surrendered shortly after the police moved in mid-afternoon in support of the rebels. Some loyal officials, however, believe army elements in the city are badly disorganized and they reportedly have decided to attempt a counter-coup.

Acheampong has suspended the constitution, banned political activity, dissolved parliament, and appointed a National Redemption Council executive to run the government. In addition to Acheampong and one civilian, the council is comprised of five undistinguished and largely unknown military officers. Nine new military regional commissioners were also named.

The motivation for the coup appears to lie in the personal bitterness of Acheampong and others in the coup group over their recent loss of pay and perquisites, and other "interference" in military matters by the Busia regime.

justification for the coup has emphasized general economic grievances, particularly those of Ghana's hard-pressed urban dwellers. Acheampong has also announced that recently imposed austerity measures will be reviewed, along with Busia's priority commitment to rural development. Public reaction thus far indicates considerable support by at least some groups in Accra.

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The American Independent Oil Company KUWAIT: (AMINOIL) has been warned that unless it agrees by 6 February to revise the payment schedule for exported refined oil products, all of its operations will be shut down and its concession canceled. Kuwaiti Government is under pressure from some members of the National Assembly to take steps against the US for its decision, according to press reports, to sell Phantom jets to Israel, for its leasing of naval facilities in Bahrain, and for its alleged complicity in the Iranian take-over of the islands in the Persian Gulf. If pressures on the government should increase, AMINOIL would be a convenient target because it is a relatively small producer. Kuwait would suffer only minor financial losses, and its credit in the Arab world would go up for having acted against US interests.

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